Federal Estate Taxation: Section 2036(a)(1) Transfer Requires Affirmative Action by unknown
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION: SECTION 2036 (a) (1)
TRANSFER REQUIRES AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Sixth Circuit, in National City Bank v. United States, held
that the possession by the decedent of the power to alter the ulti-
mate disposition of property, in the absence of any exercise of that
power, was not sufficient in itself to constitute a transfer under
section 2036(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
IN ORDER to preserve an effective taxing system, the federal estate tax
includes within a decedent's estate not only property he possessed at
death' but also certain property which he transferred prior to death.
The taxable inter vivos transfers are of two general types. First, trans-
fers in contemplation of death 2 are taxed because the transferor's
state of mind and primary motivations in making them are basically
testamentary in character. Second, transfers by which the transferor
does not divest himself of his total interest in the property are
taxed since the transferor thereby postpones the final disposition of
the property until his death. Thus, a taxable transfer will occur
when a life interest in the property is retained,3 or when the transfer
does not become operative until the transferor's death 4 or, finally,
when the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate an otherwise
complete transfer is reserved for the transferor's life.5
When the inter vivos transfer provisions, sections 2035-38 of the
Internal Revenue Code, are applied, the primary concern is usually
the nature of the interest which is retained after a particular transfer.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. See generally LOWNDES, & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES §§ 5.1-.14 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES & KRAMER]; 3
MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 22.01-.85 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
MERTENS]; Atlas, How to Meet the Problem of Contemplation of Death, 2 J. K. LASSER's
ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 1165 (1966); Barry, The Taxation of Transfers in Contempla-
tion of Death, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 370-76 (1959).
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) (1). See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER §§ 8.1-.15;
3 MERTENS §§ 24.01-.39; Comment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 631 (1962); 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 602
(1964).
&INT. RIEv. CODE OF 1954, § 2037. See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER §§ 7.1-10; 3
MERTENS §§ 23.01-.39; Foosener, How to Meet the Issue of Transfers Intended to Take
Effect at Death, 2 J. K. LASSER'S ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 1201 (1966); Moore, Transfers
Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at or After Death, 40 TAXES 876
(1962).
5 INT. R EV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036 (a) (2), 2038. See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER
§§ 8.16-.20; 3 MERTENS §§ 25.01-.50; Leiter, Estate Tax Consequences of Inter Vivos
Transfers, 38 TAXES 399 (1960); Note, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 737 (1962).
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On relatively infrequent occasions, however, the existence of a trans-
fer sufficient to support the imposition of an estate tax has been
questioned. Controversy has particularly arisen in the context of the
application of section 2036 (a) (1)6 when there has been an un-
disputed transfer of a limited property interest to a donee in a manner
such that the donee has the ability to alter the ultimate disposition
of the property but dies without doing so. The issue in this circum-
stance is whether the mere possession of the power to direct the enjoy-
ment and possession of the economic benefits of the property consti-
tutes an inter vivos transfer by the donee.7 In the broader context,
whether the transfer concept does or should necessitate affirmative
conduct on the part of the alleged transferor raises significant issues
concerning the effectuation of a coherent estate taxation scheme.
A delineation of the scope of the transfer concept requires in the
first instance an examination of the case law, for the Internal Revenue
Code contains no relevant definition of the term. The decisions have
a INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) (1). All of the inter vivos transfer sections ex-
pressly require a transfer and all share a common legislative origin. Section 202 (b) of
the original estate tax code in the 1916 Revenue Act provided that the value of the
decedent's gross estate would include the value of all property "to the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with respect
to which he has created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a
fair consideration in money or money's worth. Any transfer of a material part of his
property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the
decedent within two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall, unless
shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within
the meaning of this title." Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202 (b), 39 Stat. 777-78.
Subsections were gradually added to this section to clarify the taxation of specific
situations, but not until the 1954 Code were the various provisions actually separated
into individual sections. See LOWNDES & KRAMER §§ 6.1-.9; 2 MEaENS § 20.01.
Because the inter vivos transfer sections share this common legislative history, and
because in the development of the specific sections the requirement of a transfer
remained unchanged, it follows that a "transfer" has the same meaning under all tile
sections. See Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1956);
LOWNDES & KRAMER § 9.1, at 163. Therefore, even though this note will focus on
§ 2036 (a) (1), the discussion is equally applicable to the other inter vivos transfer sections.
7 United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), examined the transfer concept in a
distinguishable context. In that case the decedent had established an irrevocable trust
but had retained the power to distribute the income to the beneficiaries or to accum-
ulate it in the corpus. The issue was whether the increments added to the corpus
by his exercise of the power to accumulate constituted a transfer under the predecessors
of § 2036 (a) (2) or § 2038. See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text. Although
the Court phrased the issue in terms of whether there had been a transfer by the
decedent, the scope of the problem was how much the decedent transferred, not
whether he had initially made a transfer. 383 U.S. at 632-33. See Lowndes &
Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 105, 106-13 (1966).
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generally dealt'with difficulties arising in three specific areas, namely,
retirement annuities purchased by an employer, vested property
rights, and life insurance contracts. With respect to the first category,
retirement annuity contracts purchased by an employer for his em-
ployees usually provide the employee with an option to convert the
mode of payment provided in the policy to one of several alternative
arrangements.8 Prior to the addition of section 20399 in the 1954
Code, the question of whether these annuities were taxable to a
decedent-employee's estate frequently arose. In Adeline S. Davis,10
the decedent exercised such an option and converted the policy from
an annuity for life to a joint annuity.1 The court held that the
decedent had made a taxable transfer under either the predecessor
of section 2036 (a) (2) or of section 2038.12
In comparison, the decedent in Libbey v. United States'3 did not
exercise his option to convert the policy.1 4 Arguing that nevertheless
there had been a transfer, the Government contended that
since Libbey had the option to convert the ten-year annuity to a
life annuity, by refraining from doing so he assured that his wife
would receive any unpaid annuity at his death and thereby he in-
'Among typical pay-out arrangements and conversion options are the following:
(I) an annuity for a term of years; (2) an annuity for life; (3) a cash refund annuity
which provides for monthly payments with a lump sum payment to the decedent
employee's estate or his benficairy in the amount, if any, by which the proceeds when
applied toward the purchase of the annuity exceed the total of the payments received;
(4) a joint and last survivor annuity, which provides lifetime payments to the em-
ployee and then to such beneficiary as he designates if the beneficiary survives; (5) a
joint and one-half survivor annuity, which provides a larger monthly payment to the
annuitant for life than the regular joint and last survivor annuity but pays the survivor
only one-half that amount. Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 (N.D. Cal.
1956).
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039. Section 2039, enacted in 1954, expressly provides
for the taxation of retirement annuity contracts. Therefore, while the cases discussed
in this section are still valid as they relate to the transfer concept, the precise practical
problem which they present will no longer arise with respect to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 2035-38. See Note 67 infra and accompanying text.
1027 T.C. 378 (1956).
1 Id. at 379.
12 Id. at 381; accord, Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942);
Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 634
(1941).
2"1147 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
"Id. at 384. See also Estate of King, 28 Wis. 2d 431, 137 N.W.2d 122 (1965) (an-
nuitant did not have any option to convert the policy to another pay-out arrange-
ment); Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955) (same).
Vol. 1967: 873]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
directly effected a transfer intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at his death.15
The court, however, held that no transfer within the "plain lan-
guage"'' of the section had occurred. The distinction between the
factual circumstances in the two cases which led to disparate results
is simply that in Davis there was overt action by the donee while in
Libbey there was none.
A similar explanation applies where a property interest is vested
in an individual by the operation of local law. While the determina-
tion of the respective property interests is controlled by state law, the
tax effect of that determination is a matter of federal law:' 7 if local
law prescribes that a property interest is vested in an individual, a
renunciation of that right will constitute an overt act which will
satisfy the requirement of a transfer under the estate tax.'8 In Anna
H. Kinney 9 the decedent was the sole surviving trustee and life bene-
ficiary of a testamentary trust established by her deceased husband.
Stock dividends were paid to the trust, and as a matter of New York
property law the right to those dividends became vested in the life
beneficiary.20 Although the decedent, in her role as trustee, took no
action to distribute the dividends, she was found, in her role as bene-
ficiary, to have consciously renounced her right to the dividends.
The court held that a transfer within the meaning of section 2036
(a) (1) had occurred because the decedent, as beneficiary, had been
15 147 F. Supp. at 384.
'Old. at 385. The language of the Libbey court is typical of that used by the courts
in determining the issue of transfer. It is conclusory and does not indicate why a
particular result was reached.17Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937);
Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934). But see Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d
Cir. 1955).
Is Compare Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641(1933), with Commissioner v. Vease's Estate, 314 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963) and Hardenberg
v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
In Hardenberg the taxpayers were heirs of an intestate decedent. Local law
provided that title to the intestate's property vested in his heirs at the moment of
death. The heirs, however, renounced their gift, and it was held that they had made
a taxable transfer to the other takers. On the other hand, in Brown the taxpayer was
a legatee under a will, and local law there provided that title to the legacy did not
vest in the legatee until distribution of the estate was made. Therefore, when this
gift was renounced by the taxpayer, no taxable transfer occurred because the taxpayer
was vested with no title which he could transfer; rather, he possessed merely the right
to accept or reject the gift.
1- 89 T.C. 728 (1963).
20 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1005, repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 336, § 2.
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vested with the right to the dividends and by her inaction, as trustee,
had permitted them to become part of the trust corpus; thus, as a
result of the respective positions which she had assumed in her dual
capacity, the decedent had transferred the economic benefit of the
dividends to the remaindermen.21
In contrast, the decedent in Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs22 possessed
a valid claim against her husband's estate. Although the estate had
sufficient assets, the decedent-executrix made no effort to collect
the debt. Pursuant to the husband's will, the wife was given a
life interest in the income from the residuary estate, and the re-
mainder was to have been distributed to the decedent's daughter.
Accordingly, it was argued that since the decedent would have de-
pleted the residue if she had collected the debt, her failure to demand
payment bestowed an economic benefit on her daughter. While
recognizing and conceding the economic effect of the arrangement,
the court, nevertheless, held that the inaction on the part of the
decedent was not a transfer by the decedent under the predecessor of
2 1Because the dividends were in the trust and no action to remove them was ever
taken, it might seem that no transfer could be present in Kinney. This conclusion
results from a failure to appreciate the separation of title inherent in a trust. The
legal title, and the tangible evidence of that title in the form of the stock dividend
were, it is true, paid to the trust. However, the beneficial title to those dividends was
vested in the income beneficiary by the operation of the New York property law. The
overt transfer resulted when Mrs. Kinney "consciously waived and renounced" her
beneficial right to the dividends which she thereby transferred to the trust. The
conceptual difficulty develops from the fact that there was no tangible object in-
volved in the transfer; rather, all that was transferred was the intangible beneficial
title to the dividends. The analogy to the renunciation by an heir is readily apparent.
The Kinney court explained that the lack of necessity for an affirmative declaration
of renunciation was the result of Mrs. Kinney's dual capacity as trustee and bene-
ficiary: "that she, as trustee, elected not to engage in the empty ritual of transferring
legal title to her name in her individual capacity so that she might merely transfer
legal title back to the trust does not change the essential nature of her intention." 39
T.C. at 731.
An alternative explanation of the affirmative action in Kinney is possible by com-
parison to Davis v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In Davis, the overt
action constituting a transfer resulted when the specific pay-out scheme expressly pro-
vided in the annuity contract was affirmatively altered by the election of the decedent.
In Kinney, while the trust instrument was silent as to a pay-out arrangement for
stock dividends, the New York property law supplemented the instrument by providing
that stock dividends should be paid to the life beneficiary. That scheme was sub-
stantively changed by Mrs. Kinney when she, as trustee, elected not to distribute the
dividends to herself as beneficiary, but rather accumulated them to corpus. There-
fore, notwithstanding her lack of "physical" transfer, she affirmatively altered the pay-
out scheme by an action sufficiently overt for classification as a transfer.
22 13 T.C. 131 (1949).
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2036 (a). 23  In Beggs, unlike Kinney, the decedent had possessed
only an enforceable claim.24 While an economic benefit had been
conferred on a third person, it did not result from the renunciation
of an interest vested in the decedent by the operation of law. Thus,
the Beggs case highlights an element which is implicit in the con-
cept of transfer, namely, the existence of a property interest with
respect to which the decedent must have taken affirmative action.
The exercise of the incidents of ownership of a revocable life
insurance policy, notably when those incidents include the right
to change beneficiaries, the power to alter the mode of settlement,
and the right to surrender the policy for its cash surrender value,25
similarly brings the applicability of section 2036 (a) (1) into question.
In In re Pyle's Estate26 the decedent purchased an insurance policy on
the life of her husband. Later she exercised the power to select the
mode of settlement by which she retained a life interest in the pro-
ceeds with distribution to her children at her death. The court
easily found the necessary action for a transfer in the settlement elec-
tion2 and thus taxed the decedent's estate under section 2036 (a) (1).28
However, National City Bank v. United States,29 a recent case of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, provides a contrast to In re
Pyle's Estate. In National City Bank the decedent's husband pur-
chased life insurance on his own life and some years later selected a
mode of settlement by which, if his wife survived, the proceeds of
231d. at 137-38. It appears from the factual context of the case that the court was
referring particularly to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (c) (1) (B), 53 Stat. 121, predecessor
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) (1).
21 Mrs. Beggs' claim had been extinguished at the time of her death by the running
of the statute of limitations. 13 T.C. at 134.
25 Some of the other common incidents of ownership include the following: (1) the
power to assign the policy; (2) the power to revoke an assignment in some situations;
(3) the power to pledge the policy as collateral for a loan; (4) the power to obtain
a loan from the insurer against the surrender value of the policy. See KEETON,
BASIC INSURANCE LAW 168 (1960); LOWNDES & KRAMER § 13.7, at 279-81; 2 MERTESS
§ 17.10, at 350-54; VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed. 1951).
28 313 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1963).
27id. at 330; accord, Savage v. United States, 331 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1964); Rundle
v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Ohio 1960); Estate of John Tuohy, Jr., 14 T.C. 245
(1949).
28 The tax court stated that "it was her act [in electing the mode of settlement]
and not the insured's death that directed the manner in which the funds were to be
handled." 36 T.C. 1017, 1020 (1961). (Emphasis added.) In affirming, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that "transfer could be accomplished only through the exercise of ownership
rights created by the terms of the policy .... ." 313 F.2d at 330. (Emphasis added.)
2"371 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1966). See Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl.
1962).
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the policies were to be held at interest for her life and at her death
distributed to the children. Thereafter he assigned the policies to
his wife. However, none of the rights or options possessed by the
decedent-wife as a result of the assignment was ever exercised,30 thus
leaving the mode of distribution as provided prior to the assignment.
Nonetheless the decedent did possess the power to control the ulti-
mate disposition of the policy proceeds. Therefore, the Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency against the estate, claiming that the value
of the proceeds should have been included in the estate under sec-
tion 2086 (a) (1).
In the refund suit, the district court held that the decedent had
adopted the mode of settlement selected by her husband since the
failure to revoke or to alter it could only be construed as a "silent
acceptance of the transfer of the proceeds to her daughters with a
retention of a life interest in herself."31 The Sixth Circuit, in re-
versing the trial court, reasoned that "giving the word 'transfer' its
ordinary meaning, we are not willing to hold that mere inaction,
acquiescence or 'silent acceptance,' without more on the part of Mrs.
Dauby, constituted a 'transfer.' "32 The court distinguished Pyle and
similar cases33 by noting that in each of them "some positive action
which constituted a 'transfer' was taken by the decedent .... ,,3
While the court recognized that the decedent could have taken affirm-
ative action which would have constituted a transfer, it noted that she
did not in fact do so. Rather, the court found that the property
30 Because the assignment was an absolute assignment of a revocable insurance policy,
Mrs. Dauby possessed all -the incidents of ownership mentioned in note 25 supra and
accompanying text.
31 The district court argued: "It must be presumed that a person ordinarily intends
the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.
As possessor and owner of all the incidents of ownership in the three insurance policies
under the facts and circumstances shown, it must be presumed that Pearl Dauby in-
tended and did accept that disposition of the insurance proceeds made at the time of
Jerome Dauby's death in accord with his election. The fact that Pearl Dauby did not
revoke the mode of settlement can be construed only as a silent acceptance of the
transfer of the proceeds to her daughters with a retention of a life interest to herself."
National City Bank v. United States, Civil No. C-62-370, N.D. Ohio, March 31, 1965.
32 371 F.2d at 16.
3"1Id. at 17. Also distinguished were Savage v. United States, 331 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.
1964); Rundle v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Ohio 1960); Estate of Mable E. Morton,
12 T.C. 380 (1949). In addition, O'Malley v. United States, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), was
cursorily dismissed, the court stating that "O'Malley presents a factual situation
that differs from the present case .... . 371 F.2d at 17. See note 7 supra.
", 371 F.2d at 17.
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passed to the children under the mode of settlement selected by the
decedent's husband.35
Reconciliation of the cases which found no transfer by the
decedent36 with those where a transfer was recognized37 is possible
only if positive action by the decedent is seen as the determinative
factor. But for that element the cases are virtually indistinguishable:
each decedent held a life interest in the property concerned, retained
the power to control the final disposition of that property, and con-
ferred a benefit upon a third person by the exercise or nonexercise
of that power. However, to make the consequence of taxation de-
pend on the presence of overt action would conceivably frustrate the
taxing scheme. Arguably, therefore, as urged by the Government in
Libbey, 8 Beggs,3 9 and National City Bank,40 the decedents in those
cases should have been taxed in the same manner as the decedents to
whom affirmative conduct was ascribed4' because, as a practical
3r See also Estate of Idamay S. Minotto, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 514 (1950), where
the court framed the issue in terms of who made the transfer in determining if the
decedent was taxable under § 2036 (a) (1). The factual similarities between Minotto
and National City Bank are significant. In both cases the decedent's interest resulted
from an election of the insured prior to the assignment to the decedent. In both cases
the decedent became the owner of the policy with the power to defeat the election
made by the insured, but in neither case did the decedent exercise the power. Finally,
in both cases, since the proceeds were distributed according to the mode of settlement
chosen by the insured, the courts held that the decedent had not made the transfer.
The only distinction between the cases is the means available to defeat the insured's
mode of settlement. In National City Bank the decedent could have changed bene-
ficiaries, altered the mode of settlement, or relinquished the policy for its cash sur-
render value. In Minotto, since the beneficiaries and the mode of settlement were
irrevocable, the decedent only had the alternative of surrending the policy. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that both had the power to defeat the election of the insured, the
cases are indistinguishable.
To approach the issue, as in Minotto, by asking who made the transfer rather
than, as in National City Bank, by inquiring whether a transfer had been made by the
decedent will not result in a different resolution as to the ultimate taxation of the
decedent's estate. However, the Minotto approach may easily confuse the issue. If
emphasis is placed upon who made a transfer, attention may be shifted to the wrong
transaction, since the event sought to be taxed is not the transfer between the original
transferor and the original donee, the taxability of which has never been questioned, but
rather the transaction between the donee and the secondary beneficiaries of the first
transfer.
"6 National City Bank v. United States, 371 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1966); Libbey v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131
(1949).
3
71n re Pyle's Estate, 313 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1963); Anna H. Kinney, 39 T.C. 728
(1963); Adeline S. Davis, 27 T.C. 378 (1956).
's Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
8" Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131, 137 (1949).
" 371 F.2d at 16-17.
" See cases cited note 37 supra.
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matter, they all achieved the same end: the effective shifting of an
economic benefit to a third person. However, while the requirement
of positive action for a transfer may appear to be an undue inter-
pretive restriction in light of the substantive economic effect of the
transactions, it would seem to be fully warranted by the language
and purpose of section 2036 (a) (1), and by the interrelationship of
the various sections of the estate tax.
While a transfer is an express prerequisite to taxation under
section 2036 (a) (1), no definition of the term is provided in the
Code.4 The conventional definition of a transfer in property law is
an "act by which the owner of a thing delivers it to another person
with the intent of passing the rights he had in it to the latter."43 For
tax purposes, however, the focus is not on the formalities of delivery
and intent but rather on the substance of the transaction.44 Accord-
ingly, the courts have adopted the position that "the essence of a
transfer [as respects taxation] is the passage of control over the eco-
nomic benefits of property rather than any technical changes in its
title.' 45 Admittedly, this definition does not conclusively evince
that positive action is required for a transfer, but, when reference is
made to the factual situations of the cases which submit a definition,46
arguably such an understanding is imparted.
42 The regulations pertaining to the inter vivos transfer sections also fail to afford a
satisfactory definition of transfer. The only definition is contained in Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2013-5 (b) (1958): "The term 'transfer' of property by or from a transferor means
any passing of property or an interest in property .... ." This regulation, however,
was promulgated with reference to INT. Rv. CODE oF 1954, § 2013, which allows an
estate tax credit for the federal estate tax previously paid on certain transfers of
property made to the decedent and has no direct connection with the inter vivos
transfer sections.
,8 Cleveland Co. v. Chittenden, 81 Conn. 667, 669, 71 At. 935, 936 (1909), quoting
Robertson v. Wilcox, 36 Conn. 426, 429 (1870); accord, Noble v. Fort Smith Wholesale
Grocery Co., 34 Okla. 662, 670, 127 Pac. 14, 17 (1911); C. M. Pearre & Co. v. Hawkins, 62
Tex. 434, 437 (1884); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 13 (1936).
"See LOWNDES & KRAMER § 8.7, at 133-34; 2 MERTENS § 20.06, at 630-34. The
assertion that the estate tax will focus on substance rather than form means only that
the tax law will not be restricted by the formalities and technicalities of traditional
property concepts. It should not be inferred, however, that the tax law ignores the
means by which a transaction is consummated; for if that were the case, such require-
ments as transfer would be rendered completely meaningless.
"I Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); accord, United States
v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1960); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327, 337 (1929); Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516, 519 (Ct. CI.
1962).
6 In United States v. Manufacturers Natl Bank, supra note 45, the transaction
sought to be taxed was an absolute assignment by the decedent to his wife of in-
surance policies on the life of decedent. In Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, supTa
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The purpose of section 2036 (a) (1) lends additional support to
the contention that overt action by the decedent is necessary to consti-
tute a transfer. Its legislative history discloses that Congress' purpose
in adding the section to the code was to repudiate May v. Heiner7
and its progeny.48 Those cases involved situations in which the
decedent had made a transfer while retaining a life interest in the
property. While there was definitely an affirmative action on the part
of the decedent, the Supreme Court decided that the property trans-
ferred could not be taxed to the decedent's estate under section 402 (c)
of the 1918 Revenue Act, the predecessor of section 2036 (a) (1),
since the transfer was not in contemplation of or intended to "take
effect... at or after his death. '49 In light of the limited purpose of
the 1931 Amendment to render the May v. Heiner situation taxable,
it arguably follows that only that specific situation was intended to be
reached by the new provision. Therefore, since that circumstance
involved affirmative action by the decedent, it is arguable, again by
implication, that Congress intended reserved life interests to be taxed
only in connection with an active transfer.
The proposition that Congress intended that affirmative action
constitute an element of a transfer is buttressed by a consideration of
section 2041,50 formerly section 302 (f) of the 1926 Revenue Act.
note 45, the decedent made a gift of property in trust, reserving the power to alter the
terms of the trust. In Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra note 45, the decedent
took out insurance policies on his life and named his wife as beneficiary but reserved
the power to change the beneficiaries.
'7281 U.S. 238 (1930).
48 McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931) (per curiam); Morsman v. Burnet,
283 U.S. 783 (1931) (per curiam); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931)
(per curiam).
The present language of § 2036 (a) (1) is traceable to the Joint Resolution of March 3,
1931, 46 Stat. 1516, and to the amendments made to the resolution in the Revenue
Act 1932, ch. 209, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 279. See 74 CONe. REc. 7078-79 (1931) (remarks of
Senator Smoot); id. at 7198 (remarks of Representative Hawley); H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) CuA. BuLL. 457, 490; S. REP. No.
665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) CuMl. BuLL. 496, 532. The
committee reports to the 1932 Revenue Act summarize the purpose of the amendments:
"The purpose of this amendment to section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 is to
clarify in certain respects the amendments made to that section by the joint resolution
of March 3, 1931, which were adopted to render taxable a transfer under which the
decedent reserved income for his life." H.R. REP. No. 708, supra at 490; S. Rr. No.
665, supra at 532. (Emphasis added.)
49 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402 (c), 40 Stat. 1097 (1919). This section was sub-
stantially re-enacted by Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302 (c), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 70,
amended by Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516 [now INT. REV.
CoDE OF 1954, § 2036].
50 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2041. See generally LOWNDFs & KaAsmR §§ 12.1-.14;
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Prior to 1942, section 302 (f) provided that only exercised powers of
appointment were taxable.51 In that year, however, the section was
amended to include unexercised general powers created after Oc-
tober 21, 1942.52 Therefore, both sections 302 (c) and 302 (f), prior
to the amendments in 1931 and 1942, taxed only overt action. The
amendment to section 302 (c) did not change the requirement of an
affirmative act for a transfer, but merely provided that if the trans-
feror retained a life interest in the property conveyed, the property
would be included in his estate.53  The amendment to section 302 (f),
on the other hand, expressly altered the necessity for an affirmative act
by providing that henceforth even the property subject to an un-
exercised general power of appointment would be included in the
decedent's taxable estate.54 This amendment to the predecessor of
section 2041 indicates, therefore, that Congress is aware of the dis-
tinction between action and inaction and will explicitly tax inaction
if it so intends.
Levine, How to Use Powers of Appointment in Estate Tax Planning, 2 J.K. LAssax's
ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 1117 (1966).
51 See, e.g., Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942); United States
v. Turner, 287 F.2d 821 (8th Cir. 1961); Estate of Isabella C. Hoffman, 3 B.T.A. 1361
(1926).
Section 302 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 70-71 (1927), the pre-
decessor of § 2041, provided: "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property .... To
the extent of any property passing under a general power of appointment exercised
by the decedent ......
52 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §403, 56 Stat. 942. This amendment created a
drastic change in the taxation of powers. Previously, to be taxable to a decedent's
estate, a power had to be a general power of appointment which had been exercised
over property passing to the appointee by virtue of the exercise. The 1942 amendment
eliminated all three requirements so that with two exceptions all powers, whether
exercised or not, caused the property subject to the power to be taxed to a donee-
decedent's estate. Dissatisfaction with the 1942 Act resulted in the 1951 Powers of
Appointment Act, now § 2041 of the 1954 Code, which taxes general powers whether
exercised or not. Special powers are taxed only in the limited situation where they
are exercised in a testamentary manner as to create a second power which is not
subject to the rule against perpetuities. Traditional property law defines a general
power of appointment as the unrestricted power of the donee to appoint to anyone
including himself and his estate, while a special power is the power of the donee to
appoint to only members of a limited class excluding himself. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 320 (1940); SImES & SmrrH, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 875 (2d ed. 1956).
Section 2041, however, modifies the traditional definitions by providing that a power
is a general power for purposes of the estate tax, only if it "is exercisable in favor of
the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate .... ." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (b) (1). Accord, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514 (c) (power of ap-
pointment for purposes of the gift tax).
53 See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
64 See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
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While the language and purpose of section 2036 (a) (1) may sug-
gest that a transfer requires affirmative action, such an interpretation
is dictated by the estate taxing scheme, which contains separate pro-
visions for the taxation of transfers of interests in property and powers
of control over property. When the Service has attempted to invoke
section 2036 (a) (1) to include in the taxable estate property in which
th decedent retained a life interest and the power to effect the ulti-
mate disposition of the property, it has argued that the requisite
transfer is inherent in the mere existence of that power.55 Such an
approach, however, overlooks the fact that powers possessed by a
decedent are expressly taxed to his estate by three specific sections
of the code.
For example, section 2036 (a) (2)56 reaches transfers with the re-
served power for life to designate those who shall enjoy the income
or possession of property. In addition, section 2038 (a)"7 applies to
transfers where the power to alter, amend, or revoke is retained by
the decedent. These sections are usually applicable to the same trans-
fers because the power to "designate the income or possession" will
generally also constitute a power to "alter."5 8 Moreover, both sec-
tions require an independent inter vivos transfer so that under neither
section will the mere existence of the power be taxable. Yet, to posit
a transfer solely on the basis of the presence of a power, as the Com-
missioner's interpretation of section 2036 (a) (1) would do, leads to
exactly that consequence. The anomaly is readily apparent: the
same power could satisfy both the general requirement of a transfer
and the specific requirement of a power. More important, however,
the existence of these power provisions in the inter vivos transfer
sections clearly indicates that they are the sections which should
govern the taxation of transfers with retained powers.
5 See 371 F.2d at 16-17; Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 (N.D. Cal.
1956); Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131, 137 (1949).
as INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2036 (a) (2).
57 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 (a).
Is While §§ 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 (a) will usually reach the same power, there are
distinctions between the two. Section 2036 (a) (2) has two limitations not found in
§ 2038 (a). First, § 2036 (a) (2) extends only to powers retained by the decedent in con-
nection with a transfer made by him. Second, the power must be retained for the
decedents life or an equivalent statutory period. On the other hand, § 2038 (a) does
not apply if the power is contingent upon some event not controlled by the decedent,
whereas § 2036 (a) (2) is not so restricted. Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (b) (1962)
with Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (1960). See generally LOWNDEs & KRAMER § 9.14; Leiter,
Estate Tax Consequences of Inter Vivos Transfers, 38 TAxEs 399, 402-04 (1960).
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Moreover, powers are also taxed under a third power provision,
section 2041, 59 which relates to powers of appointment. Unlike the
other power sections, section 2041 does not require a transfer but
taxes general powers of appointment regardless of the manner in
which they are received or exercised.60 This section, however, differs
from the other power provisions in that it applies to donated powers
whereas sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 tax only retained powers. 61
Furthermore, since 1942, general powers of appointment have been
taxable whether or not they were exercised.62
Taken together, the power sections demonstrate that Congress
has given express recognition to powers of control over property and
has created diverse but specialized provisions which produce a com-
plete and comprehensive scheme for taxing them. This detailed pat-
tern for the taxation of powers, when compared with the equally
explicit treatment of transfers with retained interests in property,
strongly suggests that the term transfer should not be deemed equiva-
lent to power for purposes of sections 2035 through 2038. To do so
would only create a confusion where none need exist since a power of
control over property is taxed under an express power section and
should not be taxed under the retained life interest section.
If powers are taxable solely as powers and not as transfers, the
question remains why the Service would resort, as it did in Libbey,
Beggs, and National City Bank, to section 2036 (a) (1) to tax what are
essentially powers. The answer is simply that in all three cases the
power sections were inapplicable. Sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 and
their predecessors were inappropriate in each case because the powers
were not in existence at the time of the decedent's death.63 Section
2041 was inapposite in Libbey and National City Bank because the
50 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
00 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1 (b) (1) (1961): "The term 'power of appointment' includes
all powers which are in substance and effect powers of appointment regardless of the
nomenclature used in creating the power and regardless of local property law connota-
tions." See LOWNDES & KRAMAER § 12.5.
01 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1 (b) (2) (1961): "For purposes of §§ 20.2041-1 to 20.2041-3 the
term 'power of appointment' does not include powers reserved by the decedent to him-
self within the concept of sections 2036 to 2038." But see Johnstone v. Commissioner,
76 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 578 (1936); Estate of Charles M.
Sheaffer, 12 T.C. 1047 (1949).
02 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
68 See 371 F.2d at 16, (notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text); Libbey v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (notes 13-16 supra and accompanying
text); Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131, 133 (1949) (notes 22-24 supra and
accompanying text).
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powers in those cases were created prior to 1942 and, therefore, were
not taxable because they constituted unexercised powers of appoint-
ment.64 Finally in Beggs, section 2041 was unavailable since the
decedent's claim was not derived from a donated power as required
by that section.65  Therefore, to the extent that the power sections
prove to be inapplicable, a departure from the conclusion that
affirmative action is required for a transfer may arguably be justified
in order to preserve the integrity of the estate tax.
In light of the present provisions of the Code, however, such a
suggestion would seem to be unwarranted. In recognition of the
inability of the estate tax to reach the retirement annuity situation
presented in Libbey,"6 Congress, in 1954, enacted section 2039, which
taxes annuities directly without reference to either a "transfer" or a
"power."6T Therefore, the taxation of estates in such cases as Libbey
would present no problem under the 1954 Code. The immunity
from taxation of the power in National City Bank was expressly
recognized by the court to result solely from the fact that the power
fell within the section's exclusion for powers created prior to 1942.8
While the identical situation presented in Beggs would probably
remain untaxed under the 1954 Code, this result would occur only
because the claim had become barred prior to the decedent's death,
for otherwise it would have been taxable under section 2033 as
property possessed at death.69 Notwithstanding the inability of the
64 See 371 F.2d at 17 (notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text); Libbey v. United
States, supra note 63, at 384 (notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text).
or Estate of Eleanor H. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131, 136 (1949) (see notes 22-24 supra and
accompanying text).
e8 See, e.g., Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383 (ND. Cal. 1956); Hanner v.
Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52, 58 (W.D. Ky. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 212 F.2d 483 (6th
Cir. 1954); Estate of Charles B. Wolf, 29 T.C. 441 (1957), modified by 264 F.2d 82 (3d
Cir. 1959). In Hanner, despite the fact that the power was created after 1942, the
court held that the predecessor of § 2041 did not apply because the decedent did not
have a general power of appointment but rather only a "limited power" or special
power to appoint to a limited class. See generally note 52 supra.
67 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2039. Section 2039 was added to the estate tax by the
1954 Code in an effort to supply a satisfactory system for taxing employee death bene-
fits. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 123 (1954). See LOWNDES & KRAMER § 10.4; Kramer, Employee Benefits and
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 Duax L.J. 341; Pincus, Estate Taxation of Annuities
and Other Payments, 44 VA. L. REv. 857 (1958); Comment, 10 U.CJ.A.L. REv. 619
(1963).
68 in fact, the court suggested that had the power been created after 1942, § 2041 (a) (2)
would have been the appropriate section under which to tax the power. 371 F.2d at
18.
9 E.g., Parrott v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 870
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estate tax to reach this power, the factual situation in Beggs is so
unique that the case poses no appreciable threat to the integrity of
the taxing scheme.
Ultimately, therefore, it would seem that the judicially imposed
requirement of overt action by the decedent to constitute a taxable
transfer is sound and does not impair the effectiveness of the estate
tax. Had it not been for the fortuitous circumstance of timing in
Libbey and National City Bank and the bar of the statute of limita-
tions in B eggs, the issue of whether the possession of an unexercised
power of control over property constitutes a transfer under section
2036 (a) (1) would never have arisen since the tax would have been
clearly sustained under other sections of the Code. However, the
fact that the powers could not be reached under the power sections
does not justify the tortured and distorted interpretation of section
2036 (a) (1) which would have been necessary to sustain the tax under
that section.
(1929); Estate of Theodore 0. Hamlin, 9 T.C. 676 (1947). In these cases the unen-
forced claim of the decedent was not barred by the statute of limitations at his death
and was consequently taxed to his estate under a predecessor of § 2033.
